Three months ago, Hamas launched an unprecedented attack on Israel, which swiftly responded with an operation to eradicate the militant group. So far, around 1,200 Israelis and an estimated more than 23,000 Palestinians have died, with many more injured. Amid calls for a cease-fire, many observers are speculating what a “day after” might look like in the Gaza Strip.
Whether or not Hamas can be destroyed is a matter of considerable debate. Regardless, Israel and the United States—its most important ally—have insisted that the group can have no role in Gaza’s future administration. Instead, both have proposed the establishment of a multinational force that would include a role for Arab states—including those in the Persian Gulf. This means that Gaza could become a hot spot for geopolitical rivalries between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Qatar is at the center of this conflict. Its capital, Doha, has hosted and financially bolstered Hamas’s political wing since 2012, when it relocated from Damascus—providing Gaza with much-needed humanitarian assistance. Qatar’s support for Hamas is part of a broader geopolitical strategy to back Islamist groups, particularly those associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, along with allies Iran and Turkey. This counterbalances Qatar’s regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The small Gulf sheikhdom fashions itself something of a regional diplomat—and views diplomacy as a way to protect itself in a turbulent neighborhood. Since its traumatic 2017-to-2021 blockade, this has proved effective: Qatar moderated high-stakes talks like those between the United States and Taliban in 2020. It also secured the release of U.S. prisoners held in Iran in 2023.
The United States had previously requested that Qatar open a line of communication with Hamas in 2006 after the group’s legislative victory in the Palestinian territories, which preceded its 2007 takeover of Gaza and the Israeli blockade that followed. Since then, Doha—which does not have official relations with Israel—has actively mediated between Hamas and Israel on at least three occasions: in 2015, 2018, and 2021.
This time, Qatar is hoping to secure the release of remaining hostages held by Hamas—most of them Israeli—in exchange for a cease-fire or a humanitarian pause. From Nov. 24 to Dec. 1, 2023, ongoing talks resulted in the release of 110 hostages from Gaza and 240 Palestinian prisoners from Israel.
Qatar may go on to support nonmilitant members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza after the war. (These could include members of Hamas’s political—rather than military—wing.) Doing so would satisfy U.S. and Israeli calls for Gaza to be rid of Hamas while also helping Doha to maintain its alliances with Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Iran—countering the influence of the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia has long competed with Iran for Islamic and regional leadership. Ever since the late Saudi King Abdullah launched what he called the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, Riyadh has also supported the Arab-Israeli peace process. While Tehran—and Doha—financially and militarily back Hamas, Riyadh supports the Palestinian Authority (PA) and might wish to install the PA—which partially governs the West Bank—in postwar Gaza.
However, this could be difficult to implement. While U.S. President Joe Biden has expressed support for a post-Hamas Gaza under what he calls “a revitalized Palestinian Authority,” Israel remains opposed to any PA rule in the territory. What’s more, the PA, which many view as a proxy of Israeli occupation, is reviled by Palestinians—while Hamas’s popularity has soared. For PA rule in Gaza to be possible, Riyadh and Washington would need to do the difficult task of identifying a leader who is both accepted by Israel but also popular enough among Palestinians to dampen Hamas’s—and Iran’s—pull.
One potential candidate is former PA…
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