After the first meeting between the Golden State Warriors and Dallas Mavericks this season — a 132-122 win for the Mavs on December 30 — Steve Kerr was asked of Luka Dončić, who scored 39 points on 14-of-29 shooting and practically carved every coverage look the Warriors threw at him.
Here’s what Kerr had to say:
“We tried to mix it up on him,” Kerr said. “We single covered him, we switched, we hit (doubled) him. We tried a lot of different things, but he’s a brilliant player, had a phenomenal game. I thought the mistakes we made defensively in the first half especially were on our switches. We weren’t communicating. We had some good stretches where we were getting stops and our switches were good, and then our communication broke down. We started getting two on the ball and he picked us apart. He was fantastic tonight.”
Kerr did indeed throw out multiple looks against Dončić during that night but leaned heavily on switches. The logic behind switching: to keep half-court actions flat, bank on Dončić making shots, and hope that the Mavs lean too heavily toward the isolation side of the spectrum in lieu of getting everyone else going.
Depending on *who* is being switched onto Dončić, that tactic may range from moderately difficult to borderline impossible. On 684 isolation possessions by Dončić, the Mavs are scoring 1.108 points per possession, which includes passes to teammates who finish the possession. That is 7th among 63 players who have tallied a minimum of 100 isolation possessions this season, per Synergy.
He’s been equally deadly as a pick-and-roll ballhandler (on higher volume — 1,424 possession). The Mavs are scoring 1.113 PPP when Dončić or a teammate finishes on such possessions, 7th among 52 players who have tallied a minimum of 500 pick-and-roll ballhandler possessions this season.
The question of who gets switched onto Dončić hasn’t mattered all that much this season. Sometimes, the switch itself isn’t the problem — the fear of a counter to the switch (typically a quick slip to the rim by the screener) creates an opening for Dončić to exploit:
Other coverages haven’t mattered either, especially whenever teams put two on the ball against him around a screen (a coverage that Dončić has faced the most). That’s a credit to his teammates who are making the decisions on the roll in 4-on-3 situations. Having another top-level scorer in Kyrie Irving beside him to finish advantage possessions massively helps, as well.
When faced someone such as Dončić, you have to be able to live with certain coverage decisions and make calculated risks. Sometimes, they pay off; other times, they don’t. Mistakes in terms of execution can happen because they are forced into mistakes by greatness — but minimizing those mistakes do a huge part in tempering it.
Before tonight’s game against Mavs, I found myself wondering if Kerr was willing to start committing to aggressive coverages against Dončić early and making it his base coverage. That would entail a certain risk — that Dončić’s teammates would make their shots and choose the right decisions against the Warriors’ backline defense.
Another thing the Warriors had to prepare for: the possibility of Dončić trying to hunt Steph Curry on switches. Thankfully for them, they have extensive experience countering mismatch hunting:
Whenever Curry is being hunted, he “hedges” out to redirect the ballhandler — Dončić in this instance — and give the original Dončić defender (Andrew Wiggins) enough time to recover, after which Curry then recovers to his man. In the clip above, after Curry hedges out and recovers, he hedges out again on the rescreen, which forces Dončić to pick up his dribble and hesitate long enough for Gary Payton II to deflect the pass to the corner.
When the Mavs go away from switch-hunting Curry and try for a conventional “Angle” pick-and-roll (a side ballscreen with everyone…
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