Haiti is on the verge of political collapse. As the country’s security situation deteriorates, the international community is debating whether and how to step in. One government that played a key role in Haiti over the past two decades has taken a conspicuous back seat.
From 2004 to 2017, Brazil led the military component of the United Nations-backed peacekeeping mission to Haiti known as MINUSTAH. Since the U.N. Security Council authorized a new mission to Haiti last October, however, Brasília has been shy about supporting the operation. Brazil has offered to train Haitian police forces, but it has declined multiple requests from both the United States and United Nations to provide forces or financing for a new mission.
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s reluctance to play a more active role in Haiti today stands in stark contrast to his assertive stance 20 years ago. In 2004, Lula, then recently elected to his first term in office, was eager to project himself as a leading voice of the global south. As part of that effort, he sought to demonstrate that Brazil could be a purveyor of global public goods, in this case peace and security.
MINUSTAH was established in 2004 following a revolt against then-Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Its stated goal was to help Haiti’s transitional government ensure “a secure and stable environment” by quelling violence, especially in areas controlled by armed gangs, and strengthening the capacity of Haiti’s police force. Lula saw the intervention as a unique opportunity for Brasília’s growing geopolitical ambitions. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry described Haiti’s crisis at the time as a Latin American problem; then-Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said regional countries should take the lead in preventing Haiti from becoming a “narco state.” A total of 37,000 Brazilian troops served in 26 rotating contingents over MINUSTAH’s 13 years. Never before had Brazil taken on such a significant responsibility in U.N. peacekeeping.
At the time, the Brazilian government insisted it was particularly well-suited to operate in Haiti. Brazil lacked an imperial past or history of intervention in the Caribbean, officials noted, and, like Haiti, it was also a developing country. “Brazil’s approach is better than using guns and bombs,” Lula said in 2005. Augusto Heleno, the general in charge of MINUSTAH in its early years, argued, “We are not an occupation force. … We refuse to use blind violence. We are a force for peace.” A report co-published by the Brazilian Armed Forces in 2017 said MINUSTAH had become “a global reference” for peacekeeping missions. In the same volume, former force commander Floriano Peixoto wrote that Brazil’s 13-year military presence in Haiti could be, “without a doubt, considered a very successful epic.”
Last year, when Lula returned to the presidential palace, he argued that “Brazil is back” on the global stage. Since then, he has taken countless international trips. His frequent—and sometimes controversial—comments about the biggest geopolitical challenges of our time reflect how serious the president is about turning Brazil into a more visible global actor. There is nothing Lula desires more than reforming the U.N. Security Council, of which Brazil would like to become a permanent member.
Assuming an assertive role in attempts to stabilize Haiti would seem like an opportunity for Lula to prove Brazil’s mettle as an emerging power. Unlike its role as a bystander to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, Brazil seems to have the capacity to make a difference in Haiti. It would have the space to do so, too: The United States and France each have troubled imperial legacies in Haiti and are reluctant to get directly involved in the country again.
Being part of another mission to Haiti could also—at least in theory—substantiate Brazil’s claims to be a leader of the global south. Developing…
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