Ambassador Robert Wood
Alternative Representative for Special Political Affairs
New York, New York
April 15, 2024
AS DELIVERED
Thank you, Madam President. And thank you, Director General Grossi, for your briefing. The United States appreciates your focus and leadership in helping prevent a nuclear catastrophe in Ukraine, particularly at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
We are also grateful for the work of courageous IAEA staff, who brave hostile working conditions to support nuclear safety and security and implement safeguards at Ukraine’s nuclear facilities.
Madam President. Consistent with the IAEA’s Five Concrete Principles for nuclear safety, the United States underscores the vital necessity of avoiding any actions that would put ZNPP’s safety and security at risk.
Every member of this Council should agree on a fundamental point: It is imperative we avoid a nuclear incident at ZNPP. An incident could catastrophically impact both Ukraine and the surrounding regions.
However, Russia’s war and continued control of ZNPP pose an extraordinary risk of a nuclear incident.
Let us be clear: This risk is the direct result of Putin’s decision to continue waging an illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war against Ukraine.
But the reality is Russia does not care about these risks. If it did, it would not continue to forcibly control the plant, despite numerous calls from members of this Council and at the IAEA Board of Governors for Russia to immediately withdraw its personnel in order for the competent Ukrainian authorities to regain full control.
Across the many public statements given by the Director-General since Russia’s full-scale invasion, one plea has remained constant: The need for a reliable power supply for ZNPP.
However, Russia’s targeted attacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure directly threaten the stability of external power to the site, posing an unacceptable nuclear safety risk at the site as a direct result of Russia’s actions.
This directly undermines the IAEA’s Seven Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security, which highlights the need for secure offsite power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites.
We remain concerned that ZNPP is being operated by an insufficient cadre of improperly trained, unlicensed operators. This is a dangerous and unsustainable posture to safely maintain and operate a nuclear power plant.
Russia’s February 1 announcement that Ukrainians who have not signed employment contracts with Rosatom and accepted Russian citizenship be banned from entering ZNPP makes the staffing situation even more dire.
Russia’s blatant disregard for the need to retain licensed and experienced staff calls into question its and Rosatom’s commitment to the safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants globally.
We continue to underscore the persistent and essential imperative of avoiding any military action that leads to a safety incident at ZNPP.
We express our full support for the IAEA’s Seven Indispensable Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security, as well as the Five Concrete Principles to prevent a nuclear accident at ZNPP.
In spite of Russia’s claims of cooperation with the IAEA, Russia is now trying to use this latest incident – for which Russia is the root cause – to claim it must scale back IAEA access.
Since March 2022, when Russia illegally seized ZNPP, the international community has held its breath each of the eight times ZNPP lost external power from Russia’s attacks on the Ukrainian power grid, or when Russian forces have detained essential staff, or when shelling has struck perilously close.
We reiterate the international community’s call for Russia to immediately withdraw its troops and personnel from within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders and return full control of ZNPP to the competent Ukrainian authorities as the rightful owner.
Thank you, Madam President.
###
This article was originally published by a usun.usmission.gov . Read the Original article here. .